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ANALYSIS
OF
Noah K. Davis's Elements of
Deductive Logic

AND OF HIS
Elements of Psychology

By
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PREFACE.

THESE Analyses have been prepared at the request of the College of Bishops of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, chiefly for the benefit of our undergraduate preachers. It is hoped that they may also be of aid to other students who use the books here analyzed.

Some of this work was prepared for the benefit of my students during the years of my professorship in Vanderbilt University and proved helpful to those who were really trying to master the courses. As a student of that great and much-loved teacher, John B. Minor, I first learned to analyze with some satisfaction the books to which I gave all my strength. The best work I have ever done has been done on this plan, the work that stays with me most fully, the work that lies out before me as a landscape viewed from an elevation. It is not unlikely that others may find this method profitable.

In the study of Logic and of Psychology there are some difficulties, but these are not greater than the student meets in many other branches, perhaps not so great as he meets in Latin, Greek, or Mathematics. The man who cannot conquer a difficulty such as is here met is unfitted for an intellectual life. Intellectual training and mental independence are won in the mastery of such difficulties. Certainly since the days of Aristotle, more than two millenniums ago, students have been mastering these very difficulties.

These Analyses will bring to the attention of the student a few points not to be found in the text of the Logic. These points are noted because my experience as a teacher showed that they were helpful, sometimes necessary. Some corrections of the text will be found, chiefly in the treatment of conditionals. No man could have been more ready than Mr. Davis to acknowledge a mistake nor more quick to correct

it. Most of these corrections were discussed with him and accepted; a few are due to his suggestions.

The Logic gives in numerous cases examples of the proper application of the principles. As a further aid to the student a few of the praxes are solved, some of the more difficult being selected.

The plan of the Analyses is that devised by John B. Minor and used in his "Institutes." He explains it as follows:

"The arrangement is designed to exhibit *to the eye* on the page, not only the carefully digested *order* of the propositions, but their relative *subdivision* also, indicated by their standing more or less *to the right*. The most prominent propositions are designated by the Roman numerals I., II., III., etc., on the *extreme left* of the page; and then, as a guide to the reader, the intended position of the subordinate headings (designated by the Arabic numerals 1, 2, 3, etc.) is shown by small letters attached to the figures (1^a , 1^b , 1^c , etc.). Thus the subordinate heading *first* in importance and comprehensiveness is indicated by 1^a , and the subsequent topics corresponding to that (being placed as nearly under it as possible) are designated as 2^a , 3^a , etc. So the next in subordination is represented as 1^b , placed a little further to the right, and the subsequent corresponding heads (as nearly under 1^b as possible) by 2^b , 3^b , etc." ("1 Minor's Institutes," Preface, pages 6, 7.)

In the following Analyses the figures on the right-hand margin refer to the sections and pages of the Logic and Psychology.

COLLINS DENNY.

RICHMOND, VA., August 24, 1916.

ANALYSIS OF NOAH K. DAVIS'S ELEMENTS OF DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.

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 - 1^f. Some kinds of necessity:
 - 1^g. Philosophical, absolute, no conceivable alternative—*e. g.*, axioms.
 - 2^g. Physical, causative, no real but a conceivable alternative—*e. g.*, the fall of an unsupported stone.
 - 3^g. Practical, means to an end—*e. g.*, to build *must* have material.
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 - 2^c. Any violation of these laws is false in thought and in reality.

3^c. The laws are related to existence, not positively, but negatively.

4^b. The Postulate of Logic.....§13, p. 13

5^b. The solution of an example.....§14, p. 14

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1^b. The definition.....§15, p. 15

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1^c. The three movements of thought in forming notions.

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2^e. Marks, and their several kinds.

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1^c. Common names.

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2^c. Proper names.

4^b. Concepts viewed with reference to their contents, they are considered as comprehending marks or extending to things. This is the quantity of *concepts*.

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1^c. The intension of concepts.

1^d. By what determined.

2^d. What definition is.

2^c. The extension of concepts.

1^d. By what determined.

2^d. What division is. (Note that *connotation* refers to intension, *denotation* to extension.)

3^d. The correlation of intension and extension.

4^d. How predicates are thought.

5^b. Concepts viewed with reference to the mind, or thinking subject, they are considered as having gradations toward perfection. This is the quality of *concepts*.

§21, p. 23

1^c. In what progress in knowledge chiefly consists.

1^d. Passing from obscure to clear thinking.

1^e. How this is accomplished.

1^f. By negative judgments setting apart a whole from other wholes, especially where they lie near to each other; *or* by remarking a specific difference—*e. g.*, blessed is the man that walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly, etc.

2^d. Passing from confused to distinct thinking.

1^e. How this is accomplished.

1^f. By affirmative judgments, viewing a concept as a plurality, distinguishing the marks or the objects that constitute it. *Or* the notion is applied to its various objects, and it then becomes known by what is contained under it—*e. g.*, charity beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things.

2^f. What precedes and what follows.

3^f. The natural and logical order to explain any obscure thing.

2^e. Its two modes.

1^f. Distinctness in intension, and how attained.

2^f. Distinctness in extension, and how attained.

3^e. Primitive notions have no distinctness.

6^b. Solution of examples—*e. g.*.....§22, p. 25

1. Apple: red-positive, accidental, original, simple (because there is no specific difference. Neither red nor any other primary color can be analyzed. It is a simple object of vision), common.

2. Truth is abstract; truthful is concrete.

7^b. Concepts viewed with reference to each other, they are considered in reciprocal relations as the same or different, as containing or contained, as coördinate or subordinate. This is the relation of *concepts*.

1^c. The wholes under which mind thinks its objects.

§23, p. 26

1^d. The Qualitative or Logical Whole.

1^e. Its character.

1^f. It is entirely subjective, a creation of thought, and its parts are separable only by abstraction.

2^f. It is general, and its parts are general.

3^f. Whatever can be said of a concept applies to each class and to each individual coming under the concept.

2^e. Its kinds.

1^f. Intensive, whose parts are marks.

2^f. Extensive, whose parts are kinds.

2^d. The Quantitative or Mathematical Whole. .§24, p. 27

1^e. Its character.

1^f. Since it is often determined by an objective reality and so corresponds to it, this whole is not so entirely subjective.

2^f. Its parts are separable only by dissection. Both it and its parts are individual.

3^f. Whatever is said of a quantitative whole is said of the whole and does not apply to each individual.

2^e. Its kinds.

1^f. The integral whole.

1^g. Organic whole, as a flower.

2^g. Inorganic whole, as a stone.

2^f. The collective whole.

2^c. How the importance of this distinction is seen.

1^d. Both forms intermingle in our thoughts.

2^d. The principles applicable to reasoning in one of these wholes are different from the principles applicable to reasoning in the other.

3^d. Radical defects in logical theory are due to a neglect of the distinction.

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2^d. The transference from one to the other is often very easy and takes place almost unconsciously.

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2^h. The character of the parts.

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2ⁱ. But new individuals.

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1^g. The sections may be homogeneous, or

2^g. The sections may be heterogeneous.

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1^h. What they are.

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 - 1^k. What this means.
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 - 22. Circle: "Curved line returning upon itself" is the proximate genus, and the remainder of the sentence is the specific difference. The definition is real and is incorrect. "Returning upon itself" and "within called the center" are superfluous, because the base of a cone is a circle, and every point of its circumference is equidistant from the apex of the cone. A circle is not a line, but a plane figure.
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- II. This second part is only another aspect of the details. The application of the fundamental laws in the first part has not been pointed out because it was too obvious. A general example will suffice. If any genus (X) be divided by dichotomy into its species, A and non-A, then the genus X must be affirmed of both these species in turn by the Law of Identity—*e. g.*, every A is X, and every non-A is X. The species must be denied of each other by the Law of Contradiction—*e. g.*, no A is non-A. One species being denied of a thing, the other must be affirmed by the Law of Excluded Middle, there being no middle ground—*e. g.*, whatever is not non-A is A. The Laws should never be forgotten, as they are the very corner stone, the root of the whole theory of thought.
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 - 1^j. Note the difference between the affirmative *a few* and the negative *few*.
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 - 1^j. Its divisive sense.
 - 2^j. Its indivisive, undistributed sense.
 - 3^j. Its semi-definite sense.
- 4^f. Scheme of propositional forms combining quantity and quality.....§67, p. 75
- 4^e. Complex propositions.....§68, p. 75
 - 1^f. These, when not also compound, involve with the principal judgment one or more subordinate judgments.
 - 1^g. How the subordinate element appears.
 - 2^f. Subdivision of complex propositions.

- 1^g. Explicative clauses.
- 2^g. Restrictive clauses.
 - 1^h. Concessive clauses.
 - 2^h. When a restriction is a condition.
- 3^f. Complex propositions are treated as simple propositions.
- 1^g. In reducing to strict logical form what is needful.
- 5^e. Solution of some examples.....§69, p. 77
 4. Categorical: The live thunder is that which leaps among the rattling crags from peak to peak, A, individual—integral whole—essentially positive.
 - 11^a. Categorical: Some patriots are not disinterested, O, not individual; disinterested is negative.
 - 18^a. Categorical: Few, or none, who know me are—some who know me are, I, not individual; some who know me are not—is a form, according to the rule, that few mean some not. But in this example the negative belongs to the qualifier, not to the copula. This makes an exception, but it is an idiomatic expression, and idioms do not conform to rules, grammatical or logical.
- 10^b. Compound propositions.....§70, p. 79
 - 1^c. What they are.
 - 2^c. Kinds of Compound Propositions.
 - 1^d. Those that are quite obvious.
 - 2^d. Exponibles.....§71, p. 79
 - 1^e. Their kinds.
 - 1^f. Exclusives.
 - 2^f. Exceptives.
 - 1^g. Note the different meanings of “but” and see 2 Corinthians 4: 17; 2 Samuel 19: 36 (R. V.).
 - 2^e. How the components differ.
 - 3^e. The difference between exclusives and exceptives—*e. g.*,
 Only A is B—all A is B; no non-A is B.
 All but A is B=no A is B; all non-A is B.
 - 4^e. Exclusive and exceptive particles.
 - 1^f. What effect when qualifying a definite or semi-definite subject?
 - 2^f. What result when qualifying the entire predicate?
- 5^e. Semi-definite propositions.....§72, p. 81

- 1^f. What these are, how they occur, and the meaning of the semi-definite *some*.
- 2^f. Why the semi-definite proposition must be denied a position among the simple forms.
- 1^g. Logic proposing a thorough analysis cannot stop short of simple forms.
- 2^g. Simple and compound forms cannot rank as co-ordinate.
- 3^c. Quantified predication.....§73, p. 82
 - 1^d. The predicate of a simple qualitative proposition has no quantity whatever.
 - 1^e. Shown for intensive affirmative and negative propositions.
 - 2^e. Shown for extensive affirmative and negative propositions.
 - 2^d. When quantity is thought into the predicate, what results?
 - 1^e. Small letter symbols.
 - 2^e. The two views that may be taken of these forms.
 - §74, p. 83
 - 1^f. With reference to their origin, they are compound qualitative propositions.
 - 2^f. Without reference to their origin, but viewed in themselves, they are quantitative propositions.
 - 1^g. Afa considered.
 - 2^g. Negative forms.
 - 3^e. What of a system of a logic built upon the quantification of the predicate?
 - 3^d. Rule for quantifying the predicate.....§75, p. 85
 - 1^e. When a quantified predicate is properly spoken of.
 - 2^e. Note that only universals distribute the subject, only negatives distribute the predicate.
 - 4^c. Solution of some examples.....§76, p. 85
 8. Compound, obvious. Some of those who meet here are not those who shall part—O. The snow is that which shall be the winding sheet of many who meet here—A.
 9. Complex. No fireside, howso'er defended, is without one vacant chair—E. Here *but* means that not. It is neither exceptive nor adversative. "Howso'er defended" is a concessive clause, excluding the possible exception of a defended fireside, thus

strengthening the universal negative. What about the *but* in Acts 4: 20?

3^a. Deduction.

1^b. Immediate inference.

1^c. Definition of judgments.....§77, p. 87

2^c. Division of judgments.

1^d. Intuition.

2^d. Inferences defined.

3^d. Inferences divided.

1^e. Inductive inferences defined.

2^e. Deductive inferences defined and divided.

1^f. Immediate inference defined.

2^f. Mediate inference defined.

3^c. Implication distinguished from inferences..§78, p. 88

1^d. Implied judgments.

1^e. Intensive and extensive judgments coexist.

2^e. Correlatives.

3^e. Active and passive forms.

4^e. Incomplete speech.

5^e. Neither compounding two or more simple propositions nor resolving a compound proposition is an inference.

4^c. Rule limiting quantification.....§79, p. 89

1^d. Violation of this rule is *the illicit process*.

5^c. Kinds of immediate inference.

1^d. Determination.....§80, p. 90

1^e. Adding the same marks to both terms of a proposition.

1^f. Guard against using a determinant ambiguously.

2^f. Subtraction of the same mark from both terms, while legitimate, is not inference.

2^e. Adding the two terms of a proposition as marks to the same concept.

3^e. Combining two propositions.

2^d. Infinitation.....§81, p. 91

1^e. What it is.

2^e. Rule for infinitation.

3^d. Conversion.....§82, p. 91

1^e. What it is.

2^e. Kinds of conversion.

1^f. Simple conversion.

1^g. Transposes terms without change of quantity or quality, and is applicable to E and I.

- 2^f. Conversion per accidens.
 - 1^g. Reduces quantity without change of quality, and is applicable to A.
 - 1^h. Cannot reverse this step without illicit process.
 - 1ⁱ. If the proposition be *afa* or *ifa*, it is convertible to A.
 - 2^g. What the conversion per accidens of E is.
- 3^f. Conversion by contraposition.
 - 1^g. Changes quality, but not quantity, and is applicable to O, also to A.
 - 2^g. Rule for contraposition.
- 3^e. Remarks.
 - 1^f. Whole doctrine of conversion applicable to extension.
 - 2^f. Individual propositions, though symbolized by A or E, are inconvertible.
- 4^d. Opposition.....§83, p. 94
 - 1^e. What it is.
 - 2^e. Its kinds.
 - 1^f. Contradictory opposition.
 - 1^g. Exists between propositions having the same unquantified subject and predicate, but which differ both in quality and quantity.
 - 2^g. Rule.
 - 1^h. Of what this rule is a specific statement.
 - 2^f. Contrary opposition.
 - 1^g. Exists between universal propositions differing in quality only.
 - 2^g. Rule.
 - 3^g. Contrariety less logical than metaphysical.
 - 3^f. Subcontrary opposition.
 - 1^g. Exists between particular propositions differing in quality.
 - 2^g. Rule.
 - 1^h. The *some* in the two propositions must be a different *some*.
 - 2^h. The modification of the rule if the *some* be semi-definite.
 - 4^f. Subalternate opposition.
 - 1^g. Exists between propositions differing only in quantity.
 - 2^g. Rule.

- 1^h. This is not strictly opposition, but a specific application of the Law of Identity.
- 3^e. When the proposition is individual.
- 4^e. Solution of some examples.....§84, p. 97
 3. Every honest man whom we meet is a neighbor who deserves reward.
 7. Stated in logical form, the proposition is: Some studies much vaunted are of little utility—I (it is also possible to state it as an existential) ; hence, some studies much vaunted are not of much utility—O.
- 2^b. Mediate inference.....§85, p. 99
 - 1^c. When mediate inference is necessary.
 - 2^c. The intensive syllogism illustrated.
 - 3^c. The extensive syllogism illustrated.
 - 4^c. Definition of the syllogism.
 - 5^c. Dissection of the syllogism and the parts defined.
§86, p. 100
- 1^d. The three terms.
 - 1^e. The middle term.
 - 2^e. The major term.
 - 3^e. The minor term.
- 2^d. The premises.
- 3^d. The order of the propositions is arbitrary, as is also the form of three distinct propositions.
- 4^d. The notations.....§87, p. 102
 - 1^e. Those applicable to extension.
 - 1^f. The circular, why objectionable.
 - 2^f. The linear and its advantage.
 - 2^e. The radical objection to both circular and linear.
 - 1^f. Being quantities, they transfer thought to the mathematical whole.
 - 3^e. That applicable to extension and intension.
 - 1^f. The graphic notation explained.
- 6^c. The intensive and extensive syllogisms and the rule for converting.....§88, p. 104
- 1^d. The distinction between these forms examined and discarded.....§89, p. 105
 - 1^e. The distinctions stated.
 - 1^f. The grammatical difference hardly a logical difference.
 - 2^f. The external difference lies wholly in transposed

premises, and, the order of the premises being arbitrary, this is not a logical difference.

3^f. The copula.

2^e. The difference in kind.

1^f. The difference lies wholly in the thought, but it is of small logical consequence.

3^e. Points in common.

1^f. Both are mediate inferences through the same medium.

2^f. Both reach the same conclusion.

3^f. Formal expression of both is the same.

4^f. The supreme canon and general rules are the same.

5^f. The special rules need only the interchange of the words *major* and *minor* for adaptation.

4^e. Conclusion as to the distinction.

7^c. The syllogistic judgment.....§90, p. 107

1^d. What the *one* syllogistic judgment is.

2^d. How the syllogistic judgment is characterized.

1^e. From what this necessity flows.

1^f. The common distinction between demonstrative and moral reasoning.

8^c. Relative truth or falsity of its several judgments.

§91, p. 108

1^d. Why logic has no regard for the material truth or falsity of syllogistic propositions.

1^e. What would be an improvement.

2^d. Relations of the parts of the syllogism with reference to formal truth and falsity.

1^e. The parts summarized.

9^c. Solution of some examples.....§92, p. 109

1. "Men of genius" is the major term; "Very unwise men" is the minor term; "True poets" is the middle term. All true poets are men of genius; some very unwise men are true poets; hence, some very unwise men are men of genius.

5. Intensive. None who are liable to err are those who are safe from disaster; all men are those who are liable to err; hence, no men are safe from disaster.

10^c. The Canon of the Syllogism.....§93, p. 111

1^d. Why the canon is needed.

2^d. Modes of stating the canon.

1^e. Part of a part is part of a whole.

1^f. To what applicable.

2^e. Aristotle's *dicta de omni et nullo*.

3^e. A less objectionable form stated and explicated.

4^e. The canon of replacement stated and explicated.

1^f. Applicable to immediate inference.

2^f. View taken in this canon of the qualitative syllogism is peculiar.

Note.—Correct a statement in the text on page 113. "It considers one premise as stating a relation between two notions; the other as stating that some new notion is a part of one of them; etc." As printed this would not apply when the subsumption is negative, as Camestres, Baroco, Camenes.

3^f. The application of the several clauses.

11^c. The General Rules of the Syllogism.....§94, p. 114

1^d. The rules stated and established.

1^e. The syllogism restricted to three terms.

2^e. The syllogism restricted to three propositions.

3^e. The necessity that one premise must be affirmative.

4^e. A negative premise necessitates a negative conclusion.

5^e. The middle term must be total at least once.

1^f. The ultra-total quantification of the middle term.

6^e. An extreme partial in a premise must be so in the conclusion, otherwise *illicit process*.

7^e. At least one premise must be universal.

8^e. A particular premise necessitates a particular conclusion.

1^f. Why with one premise E and the other I no universal conclusion can be drawn? A universal conclusion must have its subject universal, and this subject must be the subject or the predicate of E, the only distributive terms in the two given premises. The middle term must be distributed once, and that term must be the subject or the predicate of E. But since one premise is negative—E—the conclusion must be negative, and that would distribute the predicate of the conclusion. If one of the terms of E be taken as the subject of the conclusion, and the other as

the middle term, there is no other distributed term in the premises to furnish a universal predicate for the conclusion.

2^d. Solution of some examples.....§95, p. 118

3. The gospel is that which promises salvation to the faithful; many whom the world condemns are faithful; hence, the gospel is that which promises salvation to many whom the world condemns. In the sumption "faithful" is a distributed notion, meaning "all faithful," and in the conclusion is simply replaced by its part, "many whom the world condemns."

8. Few men are entirely unworthy of respect—O; most men are unlearned—I; hence, two particular premises, Rule 7; undistributed middle, Rule 5; conclusion should be negative, Rule 4; predicate of conclusion a fourth term, Rule 1. But if the major premise be infinitated, a conclusion can be drawn, ultra-total quantification: Most men are worthy of respect; most men are unlearned; hence, some unlearned men are worthy of respect.

12^c. Figure.

1^d. On what principle are syllogisms divided into figures? §96, p. 120

1^e. What propositions the first figure is fitted to establish.

2^e. The second figure, whose conclusion is always negative, is adapted to prove what?

3^e. The third figure, whose conclusion is always particular, is always adapted to what purpose?

1^f. Only in the third figure can the middle term be individual.

13^c. The Special Rules of the Syllogism.....§97, p. 121

1^d. Rules of the first figure.

1^e. The minor premise must be affirmative.

Both premises cannot be negative, and if the minor premise be negative the major premise must be affirmative; but if the minor premise be negative the conclusion must be negative, and in that case the major term—the predicate of the negative conclusion—would be distributed in the conclusion and not in the major premise, where it is the predicate of an affirmative premise. That would

be illicit major. Since the minor premise cannot be negative, it must be affirmative in the first figure.

2^e. The major premise must be universal.

The middle term in the first figure is the subject of the major premise and the predicate of the minor premise; but it has just been shown that in the first figure the minor premise must be affirmative, and affirmatives do not distribute the predicate. Unless the major premise be universal in the first figure, there is undistributed middle.

2^d. Rules of the second figure.

3^d. Rules of the third figure.

4^d. Rules of the fourth figure.

5^d. These rules have reference to extension, and to adapt them to the intensive syllogism the words *major* and *minor* must be interchanged.

14^c. The valid moods of the syllogism.

1^d. The grounds of the distribution.....§98, p. 122

1^e. Why premises IE can yield no conclusion in any mood. In I neither term is distributed; but E, a negative, makes the conclusion negative, thus distributing the predicate of the conclusion, which predicate is one of the undistributed terms of I—illicit process.

2^d. The names of the moods.

1^e. The fundamental forms of all reasoning. §99, p. 123

15^c. Reduction.

1^d. Of two kinds.

1^e. Ostensive reduction explained.....§100, p. 125

1^f. Why there can be no reduction in a syllogism requiring conversion when the proposition is individual.

2^f. General rules for reduction.

2^e. *Reductio ad Impossible* explained.....§101, p. 127

A granted premise is combined with the *contradictory of the conclusion* and a conclusion drawn contradictory of the other granted premise.

1^f. Why this test is unnecessary.

Because Baroco (Fakafo) and Bocardo (Fokmafokf) can be reduced ostensively. Take the following Bocardo and follow the processes indicated by the small letters:

Some M is not P ; all M is S ; hence, some S is not P.

Infinite the minor premise and transpose the premises ; contrapone the major premise in Bocardo and make it the minor premise in the reduced syllogism. Contrapone and then infinite the conclusion of the Bocardo.

Ferio: No M is non-S ; some non-P is M ; hence, some non-P is not non-S.

16^c. The author's objections to the fourth figure.



§102, p. 128

1^d. The premises are impossible.

2^d. The procedure in the fourth figure is compound in Bramantip, Dimaris, and Camenes.

3^d. In Fesapo and Fresison the conclusion is a corrected illicit major.

17^c. Solution of some examples.....§103, p. 129

13. The conclusion is: Some profitable exercises are abstract studies. The mood is Bramantip; the notation is P:  M:  S

The example reduces to Barbara by transposing the premises, and after converting simply the conclusion of the Bramantip, increasing the quantity of the conclusion. This treatment of the conclusion is the meaning of p in Bramantip.

26. The conclusion is: Some passions are not unrighteous. The mood is Bocardo; the notation is

P:  M:  S

Test by combining with the minor premise the contradictory of the *conclusion* and reach a conclusion contradictory of the granted major premise. The resulting syllogism will be a Barbara.

18^c. Modified Forms.

1^d. The Enthymeme.....§104, p. 132

1^e. Its four orders.

1^f. The major premise unexpressed.

2^f. The minor premise unexpressed.

3^f. The conclusion unexpressed.

4^f. Only one judgment expressed.

1^g. An example:

A just man is one with whom you ought to have

nothing to do, as is shown by suffering in dreams because of such men; This man is a just man, because I have suffered in a dream on his account; hence, This man is one with whom you ought to have nothing to do.

2^d. The Epichirema§105, p. 134

1^e. Defined.

2^e. The prosyllogism, and episyllogism.

3^d. The Sorites.....§106, p. 134

1^e. What it is.

2^e. Its two forms, intensive and extensive.

3^e. Five points noted.

1^f. You can have correct reasoning outside of these restrictions, but that reasoning will not be a Sorites under the accepted definition.

1^g. An example:

All A is B; no C is B; some C is D; all D is E;
hence, Some E is not A.

4^d. Compound and irregular forms.....§107, p. 136

1^e. When a conclusion is a compound proposition.

2^e. When a premise is compound and the conclusion simple.

3^e. Some irregular forms.

5^d. Some methods of argumentation.....§108, p. 139

1^e. *Argumentum ad rem*.

1^f. Sources of premises.

1^g. Assumed without proof—*petitio principii*.

2^g. Granted—*argumenti gratia*.

3^g. From intuition—*a priori*.

4^g. From experience—*a posteriori*.

1^h. Inductions.

2^e. *Argumentum a fortiori*.

3^e. *Argumentum ad verecundiam*.

4^e. *Argumentum ad iudicium*.

5^e. *Argumentum ad populum*.

6^e. *Reductio ad absurdum*.

1^f. Its forms.

1^g. By showing that its contradictory is absurd, that its contradictory is self-contradictory.

2^g. That it is contradictory of an axiom.

7^e. *Argumentum ad hominem*.

8^e. The forms of attack in disproof.

1^f. Directly on the thesis.

2^f. Against the argument.

3^f. The burden of proof is on the one who makes an assertion, whether that assertion be positive or negative.

6^d. Solution of some examples.....§109, p. 142

1. Enthymeme, major premise omitted, Babara. Those who obtain mercy are blessed; the merciful obtain mercy; hence, the merciful are blessed.

5. This may be taken as an enthymeme, minor premise lacking, Celarent. Those who suffered such things are not necessarily sinners above others, for I tell you so; These Galileans are those who suffered such things; hence, These Galileans are not necessarily sinners above others.

It is better, however, to suppose that our Lord took the thought in the minds of the people. This was an undistributed middle, and he said: "I tell you, nay." Sinners are those who suffer such things; These Galileans are those who suffered such things; hence, These Galileans are those who were sinners. "I tell you, nay."

8. Epichirema. The Episylogism is: Whatever tends to withdraw the mind from pursuits of a low nature is what deserves to be promoted; Classical learning is what tends to withdraw the mind from pursuits of a low nature; hence, Classical learning is what deserves to be promoted.

The prosyllogism proving the minor premise is: Whatever cultivates a taste for intellectual enjoyment is that which tends to withdraw the mind from pursuits of a low nature; Classical learning is that which cultivates a taste for intellectual enjoyment; hence, Classical learning is that which tends to withdraw the mind from pursuits of a low nature.

16. To go to war is a necessary thing; to go to war is to do what will require money; to do what will require money is to do what will require taxation; to do what will require taxation is to add to the tax on the rich, for the resources of the country can stand no other tax; to add to the tax on the rich is to add to the tax on incomes; hence, to add

to the tax on incomes is a necessary thing. This is a Regressive Sorites.

27. The argument of Demetrius is *argumentum ad populum*. His argument is an appeal (1) to cupidity, (2) to pride. The town clerk in verse 35 uses the *argumentum ad populum*, and in verses 36-40 the *argumentum ad iudicium*. His argument is that the action of the people is (1) discreditable, (2) unjustifiable, (3) unnecessary, (4) dangerous.

4^a. Conditional Propositions.

1^b. The uses of the word "condition".....§110, p. 146

1^c. A real condition—*conditio sine qua non*, or *necessitas antecedentis*.

1^d. What *must* here indicates.

2^d. Note a displacement in the text: An occasion may be a condition, and may be *sine qua non*. This should come under "first."

3^d. This primary meaning has reference to reality in objects and is therefore metaphysical rather than logical.

2^c. A causal condition, *causa essendi*, or *necessitas consequentis*.

1^d. Because of an apparent plurality, the condition is not essential or *sine qua non*. This applies to many specific cases.

2^d. Deductive logic not at all concerned either with real or with causal conditionals.

3^c. A logical condition, *causa cognoscendi*, or *necessitas consequentiæ*.

1^d. Very often a real or a causal condition or an occasion is thought merely as a logical condition.

2^d. The inverted real and the inverted causal proposition furnish logical conditions.

3^d. Very often in conditional propositions what alone is found?

4^d. In simple forms the logical condition is never *sine qua non*. In compound forms it so occurs.

2^b. General distribution of conditional propositions.

§111, p. 147

1^c. The conjunctive proposition.....§112, p. 148

1^d. What it is.

2^d. Its clauses or members.

- 1^e. The subordinate clause expresses what and is called what?
- 2^e. The principal clause expresses what and is called what?
- 3^d. The usual form of writing the conjunctive proposition.
- 4^d. Conjunctives of two terms.
 - 1^e. Existential conjunctives.
- 5^d. Conjunctives involving three terms.
 - 1^e. Some laws in simple sequence touching conjunctives involving three terms.
 - 1^f. The consequent only or both clauses may be negative and may be particular.
 - 1^g. By simple sequence the author means to exclude sequences that would fall in the fourth figure.
 - 2^f. The consequent in 1 (b) must be negative and the antecedent must be universal.
 - 3^f. The consequent in 1 (c) must be particular and the antecedent must be affirmative.
 - 4^f. The ground of these laws.
 - 1^g. These conjunctives involve a reasoning; and as all reasoning can be reduced to syllogisms, the special rules of the figures apply. On critical examination it will be found that moods in Figures I. and II. can be stated as 1 (a), moods in Figures II. and IV. in 1 (b), moods in Figures III. and IV. in 1 (c), and moods in Figures I. and III. in 1 (d).
- 1 (b) with a particular apodosis is Bramantip. If all A is B, then some C is A—All A is B; (All B is C); hence, some C is A. Again, if all A is B, then all A is C—1 (a). Now convert *per accidens* the apodosis, and we have: If all A is B, some C is A—1 (b). The author has concluded (§102) that Figure IV. is a compound process, hence his statement “in simple sequence.” Also since 1 (a) is in itself a reasoning—an enthymeme—to convert the consequent makes a compound, and so he can say from his point of view “in simple sequence.” For instance, 1 (a) is Barbara; and when the conclusion is concerted *per accidens*, the process is double, compound.

- 6^d. Conjunctives involving four terms.
- 2^c. The disjunctive proposition.....§113, p. 149
- 1^d. Some explications.
- 1^e. What a disjunctive proposition is.
- 2^e. Its formula.
- 3^e. On what condition one clause is affirmed.
- 4^e. Where the condition lies.
- 5^e. What the opposed clauses are called, and what their relation is.
- 6^e. What this form of judgment involves, and what it implies.
- 2^d. When the disjunctive judgments are strictly logical.
- 1^e. The examples given.
- 1^f. In the first example the genus divided is *contentions*.
- 2^f. In the second example the genus divided is *accused*.
- 2^e. The members are contradictories, and note that contradictories differ both in quantity and quality.
- 3^e. The resolution of the disjunctive proposition.
- Either all C is D, or some C is not D. This resolves into the four following conjunctives: If all C is D, no C is non-D; if some C is non-D, some C is not D; if some C is not D, some C is non-D; if no C is non-D, all C is D. It will be noted that *in this form* the apodosis is the protasis infinitated, though this is not always the case.
- 3^d. When the disjunctive judgments are in the form, either C is D or M is N.
- 1^e. The matter of the opposed clauses is entirely distinct, and the opposition is mediate.
- 2^e. The alternative is declared not between members directly opposed, but between one of these and a consequence of the other.
- 3^e. Note how frequently disjunctive judgments are individual.
- 4^d. Modified forms of the disjunctive judgment.
- §114, p. 150
- 1^e. A series of disparate terms exhaustive and coexclusive.
- 1^f. These must be grouped into two opposed members for logical treatment.
- 2^e. Less than all the members of a disparate series, not

being exhaustive, will not yield a disjunctive judgment.

- 1^f. Why contraries—any two members of a disparate series—cannot as such constitute a disjunctive.
- 1^g. What is the case when formal contraries are affirmed disjunctively?
- 2^g. Contraries stated disjunctively as mere alternatives.
- 2^f. The copulative judgment is formed from contraries.
- 3^e. Where the disjunct members are subcontraries.
 - 1^f. The relation of this subcontrary proposition and the copulative proposition.
 - 1^g. Rule for inference from the copulative to the subcontrary proposition or *vice versa*: Sublate the whole proposition and each of the copulate or disjunct members, changing also the conjunctive *and* to the disjunctive *or*, or *vice versa*—*e. g.*, ye (cannot=) do not serve both God and mammon. Hence either ye do serve non-God, or ye do serve non-mammon=either ye do not serve God, or ye do not serve mammon. *e. g.*, Jack (cannot be=) is not both non-fool and non-knave (smart and good). Hence Jack is either fool or knave. A is not both B and C (copulative). Either A is non-B, or it is non-C (subcontrary). Contradictory disjunctives are also reducible to copulatives, and *vice versa*: The prisoner is either guilty or not guilty. Then the prisoner cannot be both guilty and not guilty. The *vice versa* means *that* contrary back to its contradictory.
- 4^e. Disjunctive, or in general conditional judgments, always affirm, are always positive, never negative.
 - 1^f. Where denial is possible, how it is effected.
 - 1^g. Where *neither . . . nor* is used there is a double denial, a negative categorical compound, not a disjunctive proposition.
 - 1^h. While *either . . . or* are signs of disjunction, *neither . . . nor* are not at all disjunctive, but are the proper denial of contrary disjunctives (page 151) and subcontrary disjunctives; hence they imply these.

3^c. The dilemmatic or conjunctivo-disjunctive proposition. §115, p. 152

1^d. The genesis of these propositions.

1^e. A disparate series transformed by a supposition.

2^e. Definition.

Note that the form of the proposition given in §111 is faulty, because disjunctive contradictories (absolute) have no *condition*. C is either D or non-D without any need of reference to if A be B—*e. g.*, if an egg be good, it will either sink or swim. But it makes no difference whether it be good or not, it will either sink or swim. The disjunct members must be contraries or subcontraries, or else contradictories under a logical universe (pages 10, 31, 149). Take this disparate series: A is either B or C or D; but A is not B. Then if A be not B, A is either C or D. The condition, the *tertium quid*, is denied.

3^e. Possible forms of the conjunctivo-disjunctive proposition.

3^b. Interpretation of the conjunctive proposition.

§116, p. 153

1^c. Conjunctive proposition the basis of the conditional forms.

2^c. When the conjunctive is thought as a qualified proposition.

3^c. Mere implications (§78) are often expressed conditionally, also qualifications—*e. g.*, if a man be under oath, he is qualified to testify.

4^c. When a reasoning is implied.

1^d. Observe that the clauses, either positive or negative, are neither affirmed nor denied.

2^d. The clauses are posited not really, but ideally.

3^d. The proposition as a whole is always and only affirmative.

1^e. What, then, is affirmed?

1^f. Merely a relation between the members, a relation of dependence, the relation of sequence which is the syllogistic judgment (see page 90).

4^d. Why the conjunctive proposition is an enthymeme.

1^e. All the various forms of inference are implied by conjunctive propositions.

1^f. Immediate inference.

Note that "clauses" and "terms" are not the same.

2^f. Mediate inference.

- 4^b. Solution of some examples.....§117, p. 155
4. Only if he happened to be there, then (I know that) you surely met him. In this compound form the logical condition is *sine qua non*, §110, 3d. In this example an occasion is thought as a logical condition.
7. Conjunctive proposition in the form 1 (a), If A be B, A is C. If any among you be afflicted, then let any among you pray, §112. (One clause is interrogative, the other imperative. Note the conditional inversion in the protasis. But in the original, "Is any among you afflicted? Let," etc.—an independent sentence.)
14. A disjunctive mediate contrary proposition (the *tertium quid* is indirectly asserted not to exist, page 151) in the form, Either C is D or C is M. The first part is dilemmatic, the second is conjunctive in the form 1 (a), and the apodosis of this conjunctive contains a double denial—Either (if A be B, A is either C or non-C), or (if A be X, A is neither C nor non-C). In the first part C and non-C are contradictories, and A belongs to the genus whose species are C and non-C. In the second part C and non-C are also contradictories; but A does not belong to the genus whose species are C and non-C.
27. A simple dilemmatic proposition in the form, Simple (b). Either I shall be checkmated at the next move, or my chess king must not be moved, or he must not be covered, or I must not capture the attacking piece. Either A is or B is or C is. Question A, and then if A be not, either B is or C is. This can be thrown into the form, Either if B is, A is not; or if C is, A is not. Take the example on page 152: Either if an angle be right, it is not acute; or if it be obtuse, it is not acute. Here "right" and "obtuse" are contraries actually, but contradictories if regarded as species of the genus non-acute. In our example the clauses seem to be subcontraries. If they be subcontraries, the example does not conform to the definition of "disparates" given on page 36. Or seems to be equivalent to *and*, hence I have worked by "a sort of contraposition" (page 152). If *or* be

equivalent to *and*, is the example anything more than a triple conjunctive? It is really a trilemma. It is not a case under this general description. It should be in the next chapter. The subsumption would be, Either I must cover, or I must capture the attacking piece, or I shall be checkmated at the next move. Change the two *ors* to *ands*. After chess king insert "being in check."

5^a. Conditional syllogisms.

1^b. Reasonings founded on conditional forms. §118, p. 158

In the first example the phrase "If the using of credit be a demand for goods" is a condition of the major premise and must be carried into the conclusion of the Barbara. On the stated condition, All forms of credit are what affect prices; bills of exchange are a form of credit. Hence, on the stated condition, bills of exchange are what affect prices.

The third example can be stated thus: Those who are either saints or philosophers are rare; those rulers who so conduct themselves are either saints or philosophers. Hence, those rulers who so conduct themselves are rare.

2^b. Recognized conditional syllogisms.

1^c. The conjunctive syllogism. §119, p. 159

1^d. What it is.

2^d. Its axioms.

1^e. How the protasis should be expressed if it be a *sine qua non*.

3^d. Its moods.

For an interesting conjunctive syllogism in *modus tollens*, see Psalm 66: 18-20. Instead of the formal conclusion, see what we have. "I looked," said Fuller, "that he should have clapped the crown on his own, and he puts it on God's head."

4^d. Its rules.

1^e. What contradiction is when the subject is individual or a generic total.

2^e. How the moods are mutually reducible. Note that this process is justified by axiom 2, page 159.

3^e. How it is usual to state the argument in *reductio ad absurdum*. See for an example 1 John 1: 10.

4^e. Sometimes, generally for the sake of emphatic affirmation, the protasis is a mere truism or an evi-

dent or admitted truth, in which case the ponent mood is so obvious that it is not expressed—*e. g.*, if a man be mortal, Socrates was mortal. If 3 plus 1 equal 4, then 2 plus 2 equal 4. (N. B.—3 plus 1 is the definition of 4.) If there be any (some) truth in history, Socrates lived and suffered. This is a variety of *reductio ad absurdum*; for the contradictory of the protasis being absurd, it must be true. So far from doubt being expressed by *these* conditional forms, it is expressly excluded.

2^c. The disjunctive syllogism.....§120, p. 161

1^d. What it is.

2^d. Its axioms.

3^d. Its moods.

1^e. The sumption always affirms.

2^e. The quality and quantity of the conclusion.

4^d. When the disjunction is subcontrary.

1^e. Why in this case only the ponent mood can be used.

5^d. The copulative syllogism.

1^e. Why in this case only the tollent mood can be used.

3^c. The conjunctivo-disjunctive syllogism....§121, p. 163

1^d. Viewed conjunctively.

1^e. In this case treated as a conjunctive proposition.

2^d. Viewed disjunctively.

1^e. In this case treated as a disjunctive proposition.

1^f. The two disjunct members, originally contraries, being reduced to contradictories by the stated condition, yield also two disjunctive forms in Modus Ponendo Tollens (§114)—*e. g.*, if an angle be not right, either it is acute or obtuse; but it is acute; hence, it is not obtuse. This is simply the disjunctive syllogism in Modus Ponendo Tollens. The affirmation of either denies the other, regardless of the condition.

2^f. Neither of the forms of the conjunctivo-disjunctive syllogism is a dilemma.

4^c. The dilemma.....§122, p. 163

1^d. The definition.

2^d. The essential difference between the conjunctivo-disjunctive syllogism and the dilemma is the disjunct subsumption in the dilemma.

3^d. Its forms.

1^e. Simple constructive.

2^e. Complex.

1^f. Complex constructive.

2^f. Complex destructive.

4^d. Why there cannot be *both* a simple constructive *and* a simple destructive dilemma.

Contrapone the sumption in the simple constructive form given in the text and treat it in tollens, and this results: If C be not D, A is not B; and if C be not D, E is not F. But A is B or E is F, hence C is D.

Let $A=C$, $B=\text{not } D$, $D=\text{not } B$, $F=\text{not } E$; then if A be B, C is D; and if A be B, E is F; but C is not D or E is not F. Hence A is not B.

Now note that this is the form given on page 165 and is simple destructive. Take this example: If A is, B is; A is, hence B is. Modus ponens.

Contrapone, and this results: If B is not, A is not; A is, hence B is. Modus tollens.

To treat a proposition in ponens and then to treat its contraposed form in tollens is to do the same thing. The reasoning in each case is the same. Hence this form cannot be accepted as additional to those given, because it is the same as 1, page 164, and only slightly disguised by a rearrangement after contraposition of the letters in alphabetical order. Truly this is a simple destructive dilemma, which is to say that a simple dilemma may appear either in the destructive or in the constructive form; but since these are essentially the same, both should not be reckoned.

5^e. Criticism and estimate of the forms.....§123, p. 165

1^d. Why they are not inferences.

1^e. Why they are not mediate inferences.

1^f. The essential feature of a syllogism is a middle term, but here is no middle term.

2^f. The number of terms.

1^g. There are four terms, and all are in the major premise.

3^f. The so-called minor premise introduces no new matter and has nothing in common with the conclusion.

2^e. Why they are not immediate inferences.

- 1^f. Where an immediate inference is indirectly involved.
- 2^d. What these forms express primarily.
 - 1^e. What the process is.
- 3^d. Why these forms should not be banished from logic.
 - 1^e. They are true, natural, and common modes of thought.
 - 2^e. They present exceedingly condensed expressions through which thought rapidly darts.
- 4^d. The nomenclature should be changed.
- 3^b. The solution of some examples.....§124, p. 168
 4. Mohammed was either an enthusiast or an impostor; but he was an enthusiast, hence he was not an impostor. A disjunctive syllogism in modus ponendo tollens. The conclusion does not follow, for he might have been both. This is a subcontrary disjunctive and cannot conclude in the tollent mood. If the supposition be between contradictories, then it is good.
 7. Or—and if. This is not *a fortiori*, but two conjunctives, giving a cumulative argument. Hence for two good reasons logic should be studied.
 14. A simple constructive dilemma, ponens. Notice the *also*. See 2 Kings 17: 3, 4.
- 6^a. Quantitative forms.
 - 1^b. The difference between kind and degree..§125, p. 171
 - 1^c. In the qualitative whole the thought is fundamentally of marks.
 - 2^c. In the quantitative whole the thought is fundamentally of magnitudes.
 - 1^d. How a quantity is distinguished from a quality.
 - 1^e. Measurable by some standard of measure.
 - 2^e. Magnitudes of the same kind differ in degree, and the notion of degree is quantitative.
 - 3^c. Distinction between kind and degree is fundamental and thoroughgoing.
 - 2^b. Quantitative notions common and proper..§126, p. 171
 - 1^c. From its name alone, a common noun, it is often impossible to decide whether a notion is qualitative or quantitative—*e. g.*, “Our white *population*” is a class; “the center of *population*” is a mass.
 - 1^d. Unless determined by the context, the thought may be either quantitative or qualitative.

- 2^c. What designates individuals and generally (§17) makes the thought quantitative?
- 3^b. The kinds of judgments of degree.....§127, p. 172
 - 1^c. Judgments of equality.
 - 1^d. The meaning of the copula.
 - 1^e. It is necessary to distinguish equality and identity.
 - 2^c. Judgments of inequality.
 - 1^d. To what axiom it conforms.
 - 2^d. The meaning of the copula.
 - 3^d. With what other notions this simple relation is often confounded.
- 3^c. The individual and the quantitative whole.
 - 1^d. In the qualitative whole the individual cannot become a predicate.
 - 1^e. What follows as to the conversion of the individual proposition.
 - 2^d. In the quantitative whole an individual is often the predicate.
 - 1^e. What follows as to the conversion of the quantitative proposition.
- 4^c. How determine whether a proposition is quantitative?
- 5^c. The complete generality of many quantitative forms should be observed.
- 4^b. Inference in the quantitative whole.
 - 1^c. Immediate inference from equivalent propositions.

§128, p. 174

 - 1^d. Its canon.
 - 1^e. To what this process corresponds.
 - 2^e. In modified form the principle applies to propositions of inequality.
 - 2^c. Mediate inference in quantitative thought.
 - 1^d. Mediate inference from equivalent propositions.

§129, p. 175

 - 1^e. Its canon.
 - 1^f. Of what this is a specific application.
 - 2^e. The logical function of standards of measure.
 - 1^f. They furnish media through which we are able to compare quantitatives which cannot be immediately compared.
 - 3^e. Matters of indifference in the syllogism of equivalence.
 - 1^f. Order of premises.
 - 2^f. Order of subject and predicate.

- 3^f. Distinction of major and minor terms and premises.
 - 4^f. Doctrine of conversion no place in these syllogisms.
 - 5^f. Figure of no moment.
 - 6^f. Moods reduced to two, positive and negative.
 - 4^e. Geometrical example.....§130, p. 177
 - 1^f. The complete generality of these examples.
 - 1^g. Passing from words to symbols is not a generalization nor an induction, but simply a translation of expression.
 - 2^g. The reverse is not a deduction.
 - 2^d. Mediate inference from propositions of inequality.
 - §131, p. 178
 - 1^e. Its canon.
 - 1^f. Syllogisms in conformity with this canon may be called partitive syllogisms.
 - 2^e. Another modification of the axiom.
 - 1^f. What syllogisms conforming to this canon may be called.
 - 2^f. A superficial distinction.
 - 3^f. The *a fortiori* conclusion.
 - 3^d. Why a proposition whose terms are in strict identity cannot serve as a premise.
 - 5^b. Solution of some examples.....§132, p. 180
 - 2. *a*. Quantitative, entire identity: George Eliot is the same as Mrs. Lewes.
 - b*. Quantitative, comparative: The speed of arrows is greater than the speed of eagles.
 - 10. The market value of my cloak is equal to \$15; the market value of a sword is less than \$15, since it is only \$10. Hence the market value of a sword is less than the market value of my cloak.
 - 15. The ground covered by the dome is part of the ground covered by the sky; the ground covered by the altar is part of the ground covered by the dome. Hence the ground covered by the altar is part of the ground covered by the sky. This is a partitive syllogism. There is also another thought in the example which you should bring out in syllogistic form.
- III. Fallacies.
- 1^a. Definition.....§133, p. 183
 - 1^b. What originally determines logical forms.
 - 2^b. What come under this wide definition.

2^a. Two needed remarks.

1^b. Logical forms, though necessary, are violable.

2^b. What does not violate logical law, however false in matter, is not a fallacy.

1^c. Overlooking this, what many logicians have included among fallacies.

3^a. Distribution of fallacies.

1^b. Paralogisms.....§134, p. 184

1^c. Definition.

2^c. Paradox.

3^c. Fallacious conversion.

4^c. Inference through undistributed middle, or an illicit process.

5^c. Sometimes the law is not really, only apparently violated.

2^b. Sophisms.

1^c. Sophisms in diction.....§135, p. 185

1^d. What is required to discover the formal fault.

1^e. How terms repeated ambiguously must be dealt with and why.

1^f. Syllogisms containing such terms are quaternions.

2^d. Distribution of sophisms in diction.

1^e. Equivocation.....§136, p. 185

1^f. This is the use of a *term* in two different senses.

2^f. Perhaps the most prolific fallacy.

3^f. The only security.

4^f. The paronomasia, or pun.

2^e. Amphiboly.....§137, p. 186

1^f. How it differs from Equivocation. In the *construction of a sentence rather than a term*. Illustrations of this fallacy are such as the following: Thank you for your book. I'll lose no time in reading it.

3^e. Composition and Division.....§138, p. 187

1^f. What this fallacy is: conjoining what has been disjoined, and disjoining what has been conjoined.

1^g. Aristotle's treatment of this fallacy.

2^f. The distinction between Composition and Division and Amphiboly.

1^g. Ambiguities wrongly resolved by punctuation.

Take the following from a Scotch sermon: "Only last Sabbath, my friends, a young man died in this parish very suddenly while I was endeavor-

ing to preach the word in a state of beastly intoxication."

A newspaper with the following introduction published some verses: "The following verses were written more than fifty years ago by a gentleman who has for fifteen years lain in his grave for his own amusement."

4^e. Accent.....§139, p. 188

1^f. This fallacy resolves an ambiguity by a stress of voice, so as to mislead, generally by an implication.

1^g. Sarcasm, how generally indicated.

5^e. Figure of speech.....§140, p. 189

1^f. This occurs when a figure of speech is construed literally, or *vice versa*.

1^g. Why this is such a fertile fallacy.

2^g. Solecisms, or perversions or improprieties of language, are included here.

2^e. Sophisms in matter.

1^d. What they are: Such as require an inspection of the matter in order to detect *the formal fault*.

§141, p. 190

1^e. What they are commonly called and why.

2^d. Distribution of sophisms in matter.

1^e. Accident.....§142, p. 190

1^f. This arises from equating subject and accident, or whenever it is assumed that subject and accident have all their attributes in common.

1^g. What Aristotle meant by accident. With him it includes everything which is distinguishable from the subject in any way and at the same time predicable of it—everything except the definition, which conjoins Genus and Differentia together, and is thus identical and convertible with the *definitum*.

2^e. Secundum quid.....§143, p. 191

1^f. This is a confusion of an absolute statement with one limited in time, manner, or some accidental relation.

1^g. What the first infers, and how it may be construed.

2^g. What the second infers, and how it may be construed.

- 3^e. Ignoratio elenchi.....§144, p. 192
- 1^f. What it is.
 - 1^g. Ignoring the refutation.
 - 2^g. Answering to the wrong point.
 - 3^g. Proving something not the contradictory of the thesis which one intends to overthrow.
 - 2^f. What it supposes.
 - 1^g. A disputant, an attempt at confutation.
 - 3^f. The wider view usually taken.
 - 4^f. In what the formal fault lies.
 - 1^g. In establishing something that is not the required contradictory of the thesis;
 - 2^g. Or else establishing something that is not the required thesis: one term at least of the conclusion not occurring in either premise.
- 4^e. Consequent.....§145, p. 193
- 1^f. What it is.
 - 1^g. To infer the falsity of the conclusion because a premise is false, or the argument unsound.
 - 2^g. To infer the truth of a premise from that of the conclusion.
 - 2^f. Putting these fallacies in hypothetical form, one proceeds from the denial of the antecedent to the denial of the consequent; the other from the affirmation of the consequent to the affirmation of the antecedent.
 - 1^g. These two conditional fallacies are identical respectively with illicit process and undistributed middle.
 - 3^f. How this fallacy differs from Accident.
 - 1^g. This is not essentially distinguishable from Accident, being nothing more than a peculiar species or variety thereof, as Aristotle himself admits.
- 5^e. Petitio Principii.....§146, p. 194
- 1^f. What it is.
 - 1^g. The assumption, as a ground of proof, of a proposition that is not proved, or not granted, or not self-evident.
 - 2^f. In what ways it may occur.
 - 1^g. When the very thing to be proved is assumed.
 - 1^h. This may be concealed by using synonyms, or a

name and its definition, either directly or in a circumlocution.

2^h. Its two varieties.

1ⁱ. Hysteron proteron, or the last first.

1^j. This does not go beyond an epithet, or a single proposition, or an inference.

2^j. The formal fault of hysteron proteron when syllogistic.

1^k. Only two terms.

2ⁱ. Diallelon, or the logical circle.

1^j. This occurs when a premise is repeated in a more remote conclusion.

2^g. When a particular is to be proved and a universal is assumed without warrant.

3^g. When a universal is to be proved and a particular contained under it is assumed.

4^g. When the problem to be proved is divided and its parts assumed in detail.

5^g. When two facts are reciprocally implicated and one is assumed to prove the other.

6^e. Non causa pro causa.....§147, p. 196

1^f. What it is.

1^g. Assuming a premise which is not the cause to be the cause of an absurd conclusion. The conclusion may be a proper sequence and its absurdity justify the contradiction of a premise, but not of the one assumed—*e. g.*, not being a bird, I cannot be in two places at once.

1^h. How detect the fallacy.

2^f. An erroneous view of this fallacy.

1^g. To suppose that it relates to *causa essendi*, and not to *causa cognoscendi*, or reason only.

7^e. Plures Interrogationes.....§148, p. 197

1^f. What this is.

1^g. A call for a single answer to plural questions.

3^b. Solution of some examples.....§149, p. 198

3. This is in form the First Figure. The major premise is an A, the minor premise is an E. In the First Figure the minor premise must be affirmative. The example is illicit major.

15. This is a correct conjunctive 1 (a) proposition. If you are one who never does anything you need be ashamed of, then you are one who need never be

ashamed of anything you do. No actions which you do are actions which you need be ashamed of—E. Convert this simply: No actions which you need be ashamed of are actions which you do—E.

28. Whoever necessarily goes or stays is not a free agent. This is granted, and "goes or stays" is used distributively. In the minor premise "goes or stays" is used collectively. In this view we have the fallacy of composition. The minor premise conjoins what should be disjoined. In the major premise "necessarily goes or stays" is equivalent to "goes under compulsion or stays under compulsion"; in the minor premise the disjunction is what is said to be necessary. To say that one must go, or that he must stay, is very different from saying that he must do one of the two; hence ambiguous middle. "Necessarily" in the major premise may be taken as modifying "goes," "stays" separately. In the minor premise "necessarily" modifies the entire clause "either goes or stays." This seems to be amphiboly, "or" being conjunctive in the major premise and disjunctive in the minor premise.
41. Everything most beautiful is what must be found in the gods. The human form is most beautiful; hence the human form is what must be found in the gods. The major premise is an absolute statement, one made without restriction (*simpliciter*). The minor premise is a statement limited (*a dicto secundum quid*) to material forms. As used by the Epicureans this may have been the Fallacy of Accent.

ANALYSIS OF THE ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY.

PHYSIOLOGICAL.

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- 9^f. What the sense of smell does not give.
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 - 2^e. The logical or formal opposite of belief is disbelief, but as a mental fact these are one, disbelief being belief of a contrary. The psychological and real opposite of belief is doubt, which two always co-exist, but in inverse ratio. Ignorance is the opposite of certainty.
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 - 2^j. With what we have nothing to do.
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 - 2^k. The judgment of taste.

- 3^k. The laws which should regulate its decision.
- 2^h. Its characteristics.
 - 1ⁱ. Always and highly pleasing.
 - 1^j. Some limitations.
 - 1^k. It is always a sensuous sentiment.
 - 1ⁱ. Where its objects are.
 - 2^k. Of what the beautiful is a union.
 - 1ⁱ. What is meant by this.
 - 3^k. Though sensuous, beauty is not a sensation nor an emotion nor a desire.
 - 1ⁱ. Whence the especial charm of poetry and fiction.
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 - 1ⁱ. What senses are æsthetic senses.
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 - 1ⁱ. What we have in these opposites.
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- 1^k. Liberty suggesting positive pleasure of pursuit.
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 - 3^j. How differing from faith.
 - 3ⁱ. Pity.
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 - 1^j. These sentiments are known as what.
 - 1^k. Their opposites.
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 - 2ⁱ. Personal honor.
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 - 2^g. How they differ from the class exclusively intellectual.
 - 3^g. What is their essential basis.
 - 4^g. Their distribution.
 - 1^h. What may be taken as generic or as implying the moral sentiments generally.
 - 1ⁱ. Moral obligation, the sentiment of duty, attending the intuition of moral law in its specific applications.

- 2^h. Those that may be taken as specific.
 - 1ⁱ. Moral sentiments in view of character.
 - 1^j. Respect.
 - 1^k. What inspires this.
 - 2^k. When the ethical element becomes predominant.
 - 2ⁱ. Moral sentiments in view of specific conduct.
 - 1^j. When another is the agent.
 - 1^k. Approbation or disapprobation.
 - 2^j. When self is the agent.
 - 1^k. Self-appraisal or self-condemnation, self-reproach, shame, remorse.
 - 1^l. When shamelessness results.
 - 1^m. With what consistent.
 - 2^m. With what inconsistent.
 - 3^j. Gratitude.
 - 1^k. By what awakened.
 - 2^k. What it is.
 - 3^k. What it inspires.
 - 4^k. In what it is essential.
 - 5^k. Its most obligatory form.
 - 4^j. Justice.
 - 1^k. To what closely allied.
- 3^a. Desire. (For 2^a see p. 82 of this analysis.)
 - 1^b. Definition. A conscious activity marked by a want, implying an impulse or tendency relative to an object seemingly fitted to the want.
 - 2^b. Its relations to the other generic powers... §256, p. 293
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 - 1^d. The object of Desire. The thing desired is properly an object of Cognition. Desire is, therefore, conditioned on Cognition..... §255, p. 289
 - 2^d. Its means. The means to attain the desired end must be cognized. Hence Desire is conditioned secondarily and specifically on the *teleological judgment*.
 - 1^e. Proof that Desire is also conditioned on a practical judgment.
 - 3^d. Proof that Desire is also conditioned on imagination.
 - 1^e. Proof that Desire is conditioned on the practical imagination.
 - 2^c. To Feeling.
 - 1^d. What Desire has in common with Feeling.

2^d. By what Desire is distinguished from Feeling.

1^e. By the specific difference of Desire—want and impulse.

2^e. By the characteristic mark of Feeling—pleasure or pain.

1^f. What Desires are usually considered to be.

1^g. What results from this.

1^h. Distinct psychical powers are confused.

2^h. The doctrine of conation, especially of motive, is obscured by making pleasure and pain all-dominating.

3^h. It leads to Utilitarianism in morals and Pessimism in philosophy.

2^f. How the confusion may be cleared.

1^g. Pleasure and pain belong to Feeling only.

2^g. Want and impulse belong to Desire only.

1^h. How feelings of pleasure and pain are related to Desire.

1ⁱ. Antecedent to Desire—"exciting."

2ⁱ. Coexisting with Desire—"attending."

3ⁱ. Consequent upon Desire—"arising on."

3^g. How the distinction becomes clearer.

3^e. Another mark of distinction is time. Feelings pleasant and painful belong exclusively to the *present*. Desire and aversion have reference to the *future*.

4^e. Feelings are related to Desires as cause and effect.

1^f. Examples.

3^c. To Volition.

1^d. Volition conditioned on Desire.....§257, p. 293

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2^d. Desire conditioned on the existence of Volition.

3^d. Strong Will implies strong Desire and weak Will weak Desire.

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3^b. Kinds of Desire.....§259, p. 295

1^c. Craving Desires.

1^d. Appetites, having a physical basis.

2^d. Appetences, having a psychic basis.

2^c. Giving Desires.

1^d. Affections.

1^c. Craving Desires (see just above).

- 1^d. To what they incline.
 - 1^e. To impersonal objects.
- 2^d. The opposite aversion of the Craving Desires.
 - 1^e. Of appetite.
 - 1^f. Distaste or disgust.
 - 2^e. Of appetence.
 - 1^f. A more negative disregard or disinclination.
- 3^d. Distribution of Craving Desires.
 - 1^e. Appetites.....§260, p. 296
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 - 2^f. To what they correspond in general.
 - 1^g. The sensations.
 - 3^f. By what preceded and attended.
 - 1^g. Sensations as causes.
 - 1^h. The sensations inducing appetite belong chiefly to the *sensus vagus*.
 - 4^f. Distribution of the appetites.
 - 1^g. Natural appetites.
 - 1^h. To maintain life.
 - 1ⁱ. Hunger and thirst.
 - 2ⁱ. Desire for air.
 - 3ⁱ. Drowsiness.
 - 2^h. To propagate life.
 - 1ⁱ. Lust.
 - 2^g. Artificial appetites.
 - 1^h. How acquired.
 - 1ⁱ. By habit.
 - 2^h. How transmitted.
 - 1ⁱ. By heredity.
 - 3^g. Longings hard to distinguish from appetites.
 - 5^f. How further to distinguish appetites from other Desires.
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 - 2^e. Appetences, Psychic Desires.....§261, p. 298
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 - 1^g. Cravings produced by a recognized need of mental life.
 - 2^f. To what they correspond in a loose and general way.
 - 1^g. To the emotions as causes.
 - 3^f. Persistency as compared with the appetites.
 - 1^g. More persistent and are gratified rather than satisfied.
 - 4^f. To what they are directed.

- 1^g. To things and to persons viewed not as persons, but as things.
- 5^f. What forms they take.
 - 1^g. Both of Desires proper and of aversions.
- 6^f. Appetites and appetences, being cravings, are primarily strictly selfish in their aims and ends.
- 7^f. Instances of the appetences.
 - 1^g. Non-social Desires.
 - 1^h. To continue in life.
 - 2^h. Universal Desire for pleasure and aversion to pain.
 - 3^h. Curiosity.
 - 4^h. Acquisitiveness.
 - 2^g. Social Desires.
 - 1^h. Ambition.
 - 2^h. Sociality.
 - 1ⁱ. To what it is akin.
 - 2ⁱ. What arises out of it.
 - 3^h. Approbativeness.
- 3^c. Giving Desires or Affections.....§262, p. 300
 - 1^d. To what they incline.
 - 1^e. To Persons. (See §259, p. 295.)
 - 2^d. What they are. Affections.
 - 1^e. Definition of affections.
 - 2^e. To what they correspond in a loose and general way.
 - 1^f. To the sentiments as their causes. Hence accounted specially human.
 - 3^e. By what they are attended.
 - 4^e. Their tendency.
 - 1^f. Practically the reverse of the appetites and psychic cravings, for they do not take, but give.
 - 5^e. Toward whom exercised.
 - 1^f. Toward persons or sentient beings only.
 - 1^g. What they presuppose.
 - 1^h. Intelligence in the subject and also a conceivable harmony or discord of affection in the object.
 - 6^e. How contrast with psychic cravings and appetites.
 - 1^f. In being wholly unselfish.
 - 7^e. Subdivision of the affections.
 - 1^f. Benevolent affections. Note how they are modified.
 - 1^g. Kinship.
 - 1^h. Its varieties.
 - 2^g. Friendship.

- 3^g. Love of Benefactor.
 - 1^h. From what it arises.
- 4^g. Racial or tribal.
- 5^g. Patriotism.
- 6^g. Philanthropy.
- 7^g. Love of God.
- 2^f. Malevolent affections.
 - 1^g. Those having a defensive or punitive element.
 - 1^h. Hatred.
 - 2^h. Anger.
 - 3^h. Revenge.
 - 4^h. Jealousy.
 - 2^g. That which is simply injurious.
 - 1^h. Envy.
 - 2^h. Cruelty.
 - 3^g. Misanthropy.
- 4^b. Its Regulation.....§264, p. 305
 - 1^c. Why needed.
 - 1^d. Because Desires often conflict.
 - 1^e. Between what desires this conflict occurs.
 - 1^f. Between members of the same class.
 - 2^f. More notably between members of different classes.
 - 3^f. In general between the Craving Desires which would take and the affections which would give.
 - 1^g. In instinctive exercise the appetites are strongest, the affections weakest, though exceptions occur.
 - 2^g. In rational exercise there is a recognized gradation in dignity or worth and excellence, affection being highest in the scale and appetite the lowest.
 - 1^h. To what this superiority of affection is due.
 - 1ⁱ. To affection having the larger share of the rational element.
 - 2ⁱ. To the call for self-denial.
 - 3ⁱ. To the intimate relation between the exercise of affection and the observance of moral law.
 - 4ⁱ. Neither class by nature has supremacy.
 - 1^j. Where the controlling principle is found.
 - 2^e. What controls.
 - 1^d. The Regulative Desires, fitted by their nature to subordinate and regulate all others.
 - 3^c. Distribution of the Regulative Desires...§265, p. 305
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- 1^e. What it may fairly be called.
 - 1^f. The moral impulse.
- 2^e. From what it should be distinguished.
 - 1^f. Conscience.
- 3^e. To what the moral impulse urges us.
 - 1^f. To pay our dues in the widest sense.
- 4^e. What is its direction and tendency.
 - 1^f. Strictly altruistic.
- 5^e. With what it is specially related.
 - 1^f. With the affections.
- 2^d. Interest, or the desire for happiness.
 - 1^e. What it is often, though improperly, called.
 - 1^f. Self-love and thus confused with the affections.
 - 2^e. To what it urges.
 - 1^f. To seek and to appropriate the means to our own happiness as an end.
 - 3^e. What is its direction and tendency.
 - 1^f. Strictly egoistic and selfish.
 - 4^e. With what it is intimately related.
 - 1^f. The Craving Desires, the appetites and appetences.
- 4^c. Analysis discussed.
 - 1^d. What the foregoing analysis seems to indicate.
 - 1^e. That the two Regulative Desires are in essential opposition.
 - 2^e. That duty conflicts with interest and impels us away from happiness.
 - 2^d. The mistake of this indication.
 - 1^e. They do not strictly conflict.
 - 3^d. How the relation is more truly conceived.
 - 1^e. As to interest.
 - 2^e. As to duty.
 - 4^d. Highest happiness as defined by Aristotle.
 - 5^d. What then appears.
 - 1^e. That the moral impulse has by nature and right the office of control over interest, and it alone is supreme over all Desires.
- 5^c. The relations of the Regulative to the subordinate Desires more particularly shown.....§266, p. 307
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- 6^c. The relation of the moral impulse to Cognition.
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 - 1^d. Conditioned on it in a special manner.

- 2^d. To what its authority is directed.
 - 7^c. Conscience.
 - 1^d. Its popular usage.
 - 2^d. Its correct definition.
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 - 1^b. Its definition. Note its functions also....§268, p. 309
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 - 1^e. Their objects.
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 - 2^d. Double relation to Cognition.....§269, p. 310
 - 1^e. Inferior as dependent on Cognition for guidance.
 - 2^e. Superior as controlling it.
 - 2^c. To Feeling.....§270, p. 311
 - 1^d. How conditioned on them, only remotely through the Desires.
 - 2^d. How it controls them, only indirectly through attention.
 - 3^c. To desire.
 - 1^d. How conditioned on them—directly.
 - 2^d. How it controls Desire—indirectly and by means of attention.
 - 4^c. Controlling power of Will.....§271, p. 311
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 - 2^d. Objective control.
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 - 1^d. The idea of something to be done, of an act in order to an end. This is an exercise of cognitive intelligence.
 - 2^d. An impulse urging the action. An exercise of Desire.
 - 3^d. A preference. An exercise of choice.
 - 4^d. Intention.
 - 5^d. A nusus or striving to effectuate the choice. This is voluntary effort.
- 2^c. The true elements.
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 - 2^f. A corresponding plurality of impulses.
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- 1^f. The function of deliberative intelligence.
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 - 1^f. As a *nîsus* or striving.
 - 2^e. What it is.
 - 1^f. The final and complete expression of the free personality.
 - 3^e. Upon what it is consequent and to what subsequent.
 - 1^f. Choice.
 - 4^e. What it effectuates.
 - 1^f. Intention.
 - 5^e. Its relation to consciousness.
 - 1^f. It is an ultimate fact of consciousness.
 - 6^e. What the voluntary effort strives to produce.
 - 1^f. Some definite change of mental state only, or
 - 2^f. To superinduce muscular movement.
 - 7^e. In what the subjective voluntary action is complete.
 - 1^f. In the mental effort, even though the proposed consequences be imperfect or entirely null.
- 4^b. Its Freedom.
 - 1^c. The different doctrines.....§276, p. 318
 - 1^d. Necessity.
 - 1^e. Forms and modifications.
 - 1^f. Fatalism, strict necessity.
 - 2^f. Determinism.
 - 1^g. The special definition of liberty given by these.
 - 1^h. Will is free when acting according to its nature, and it is its nature to be determined by desires.
 - 2^d. Liberty.
 - 1^e. Forms and modifications.
 - 1^f. In general allows that desires influence the will, but denies the determination.
 - 2^f. Exhibits the will as controlling the other faculties, including desires.
 - 3^f. Desires occasions, not causes of, volition.
 - 4^f. With what the outcome accords.
 - 5^f. What the doctrine represents as to will and desire.
- 2^e. Am I free?.....§277, p. 318

- 1^f. Why should there be concern on this question?
 - 1^g. An old, much discussed, and thus far unsolved question.
 - 1^h. Importance of the question is the apology for the attempt to throw light upon it.
 - 2^g. If I am not free, what am I?
 - 1^h. Not a person, only a thing.
 - 2^h. Neither the beginning nor the end of anything, merely a channel.
 - 3^h. Not a creator, but a creature of circumstances.
 - 3^g. Kant names doctrine of freedom as one of the three great ends of philosophy.
 - 1^h. Does it not rather lie at the beginning of all philosophy?
 - 1ⁱ. Unless I am free, there is no philosophy.
 - 1^j. Why power to discriminate true and false is not sufficient.
 - 2^j. Why in this case there can be no search after truth.
 - 4^g. Freedom a postulate of Ethics.
 - 1^h. Unless I am free, what follows?
- 2^f. A logical objection to this procedure and the retort. §278, p. 320
 - 1^g. Since search for truth implies freedom, the attempt to answer begs the question.
 - 1^h. The doubt is only speculative, not actual.
 - 2^g. The attempt to disprove freedom tacitly assumes it.
- 3^f. What is in favor of freedom. §279, p. 321
 - 1^g. Logical presumption because of universal conviction of mankind.
 - 1^h. What the necessitarian says of this common conviction.
 - 2^h. Where the burden of proof rests. . . . §280, p. 321
- 4^f. The argument for necessity.
 - 1^g. The argument examined.
 - 2^g. Various replies to the argument. . . . §281, p. 322
 - 1^h. Some assert that we are conscious of liberty.
 - 1ⁱ. If true, what this would be.
 - 2ⁱ. Why this claim is inadmissible.
 - 1^j. The notion freedom is a pure negative.
 - 1^k. What follows.

- 1¹. Cannot be conscious of the absence of a thing.
 - 2¹. Unconsciousness of constraint proves nothing.
 - 3¹. It is conceivable that constraint may unconsciously exist.
 - 4¹. The belief that we can elect either of two alternatives makes the choice future, but consciousness is of the present.
 - 5¹. Cannot be conscious that we might have chosen differently, for that would be consciousness of the past.
 - 6¹. "The power of a contrary choice" is not a fact of consciousness.
- 2^h. Other libertarians assert that the law of causation, while universal in form, is not universal in fact.....§282, p. 324
- 1¹. The nature of volitional cause according to these advocates.
 - 1¹. The futility of this position.
 - 3^h. Those who assert that the law of causation is modified in its application to mental phenomena.....§283, p. 325
 - 1¹. No statement of the modified law has been made.
 - 2¹. It is the law of uniformity that is thought to be inapplicable to mind.
 - 1¹. The reply to this assertion.....§284, p. 327
 - 4^h. Two extreme views.
 - 1¹. That the law of causation is altogether inapplicable to mental phenomena.
 - 1¹. Their explanation of spontaneity.
 - 2¹. Evidence of causation in mental phenomena.
 - 3¹. Evidence that mental phenomena are strictly the only phenomena; that only subjective changes are known immediately; that the law of causation applies originally and primarily to mind; and the transference, if there be any transference, takes place from the mental to the physical.
 - 2¹. The doctrine of free agency.....§285, p. 329
 - 1¹. How these advocates seek to save liberty.
 - 1^k. Their definition of freedom.

- 2^k. The function of desires according to these advocates.
- 3^k. Their assertion that liberty and necessity may coexist.
- 2^j. The argument for free agency examined.
 - 1^k. This definition of liberty is not the one under which we have been working.
 - 1^l. Free agency is not subjective but objective liberty.
 - 2^k. The liberty essential to personality is altogether different.
 - 3^k. Free agency is necessity in disguise.
- 3^g. Critical analysis of the necessitarian argument. §286, p. 332
 - 1^h. The premise, "a volition is a change," is not an axiom.
 - 1ⁱ. The two elements of volition, choice and effort.
 - 1^j. Effort is a change.
 - 1^k. The cause of effort.
 - 1^l. The prevailing desire or motive.
 - 1^m. The double method of agreement and difference used to establish this fact.
 - 1ⁿ. The cases which agree only in the fact that antecedent desire and subsequent effort are present.
 - 1^o. Instinctive action in appetites.
 - 2^o. Instinctive impulses in the higher desires.
 - 2ⁿ. Agreement in absence.
 - 1^o. Where no desire is, no effort is.
 - 2^j. Choice.....§287, p. 333
 - 1^k. The question whether choice exists, for its essence is freedom.
 - 2^k. The argument should not grant what it proposes to disprove.
 - 3^k. Choice is not a change.
 - 1^l. Distinguish the act of choosing from the fact of choice.....§288, p. 334
 - 1^m. Choosing as an act is a change and hence is necessitated.
 - 2^m. Choice as a fact is not a movement forward.
 - 1ⁿ. Is choice a change?.....§289, p. 335

- 1°. Choice as preference is not a change.
- 2°. Choice for inaction.
- 4^k. Choice is not caused.....§290, p. 336
 - 1^l. Argument for this fact.
 - 2^l. What follows from the discovery of this false premise.
- 5^t. Consideration of two important points. §291, p. 337
 - 1^g. Freedom a postulate of ethics.
 - 1^h. What this involves.
 - 2^g. The conditioning antecedents of choice.

§292, p. 338

 - 1^h. Some desire for each available alternative must exist.
 - 2^h. Election occurs only in view of reasons.

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